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Abstract: While current doctrines try to separate conflicts within two distinct 
categories – conventional versus irregular, there are, however, a series of 
contemporary conflicts that challenge this western view on war showing that 
the disjunctive manner of classification in ‘big and conventional’ versus ‘small 
and irregular’ is limited and simplistic. The military strategists as well as the 
academics used a series of concepts in order to describe the main shifts in the 
character of war – from the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) and ‘new wars’ 
to hybrid wars. This article aims to identify these mutations in war evolution in 
the new, post-Cold War international context. The traditional image we have on 
this well-known ‘labor division’ within the military field no longer reflects 
reality.  
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Introduction  
When a war comes to an end, military strategists wonder what the next war 
would look like, what shape would it take and how the next enemy would fight. 
The same thing happened when the bipolar confrontation between USA and 
URSS ended. In the absence of a direct military confrontation, the superpowers 
of the Cold War have repeatedly come up against one another in a series of proxy 
wars, by means of allies and their own satellites. Even if for almost five decades 
the world has not witnessed a direct military conflict, this has been a period 
characterized by intense militarisation, major investments in the military sector, 
massive arming, nuclear arsenal development and competition for global 
supremacy. It’s no secret to anyone that a potential armed conflict between the 
two actors would have taken the form of a large-scale conventional war, fought 
by national armies, in a symmetrical war on a specific ground – the plains of 
Western Germany. With the end of the Cold War and the avoidance of the 
‘inevitable,’ the optimism emerged – among theoreticians, politicians, the public 
opinion and sometimes even among military experts. The military superiority of 
the United States was beyond question, the great winner in the competition for 
the global supremacy. There were no enemies left capable to face a conventional 
attack of the American army, the world’s most potent army. The first war in Iraq 
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was nothing but a confirmation of this state of affairs, respecting all the rigors of 
a conventional war fought by the book. Nevertheless, ‘the book’ would very soon 
prove its limits, unable as it was to predict a series of military conflicts that did 
not fit within the moulds of the conventional war. The war in Bosnia, the military 
intervention in Mogadishu, the war in Kosovo, the terrorist attacks that hit the 
United States on their own territory and the Global War against Terror initiated 
in response – all these events have challenged the traditional thought in the 
military domain and have questioned the manner in which the war was 
understood as a phenomenon in the new post-Cold War context. We have 
become undeniably the witnesses of certain mutations emerged in the manner of 
fight, organization, force deployment and war character. What exactly has 
brought about these transformations? Are they final? The large-scale 
conventional war fought by the national armies of the states is now history? 
What does the future war look like and who are the new combatants? These are 
only a few questions that will guide our approach which aims at following the 
evolution of war in the post-Cold War era and at identifying the shifts emerged in 
the new international context. The objective of such an approach is to contribute 
to the understanding of the character of the wars which keep on defying the 
international peace, the understanding of the forces that determine the new 
combatants to prefer certain fight strategies and to contribute to the outlining of 
a picture of future war, including a series of possible solutions available to the 
international actors. 
The End of the Cold War and the Trends of a New Strategic Environment 
In a complex analysis of the war phenomenon and of the transformations 
registered in the new context, Gat and Maoz identified, in 2001, three scenarios 
on the future of war (Maoz and Gat, 2001, 1-3). The first scenario considers war 
an outdated and useless instrument, subject to the possibility of transformation 
and the risk of disappearance as any other social institution (e.g. slavery or duel). 
Modern societies regard the war as an instrument incompatible with the new 
economic conditions, social norms, given in particular the enormous destructive 
capacities it supposes. The fact that during the years of the Cold War there was 
no major war between the powers is considered an indicator of the tendency to 
give up war as instrument of conflict resolution. The second scenario starts from 
the observation that war is a social institution as old as humanity, which 
permanently accompanied the individuals along their history and that almost 50 
years of peace cannot represent a serious indicator attesting the elimination of 
war from the international practice. Even if war is influenced by the social, 
economic, technological and political developments suffering thus 
transformations in time, the phenomenon in itself and its essential forms of 
manifestation do not disappear. Thus, in summary, the second hypothesis argues 
that the essential structure of war will not change in the future. The third 
scenario seems to capture better the post-Cold War reality and starts from the 
Conflicts and Instability in Contemporary Security Environment 
375 
ascertainment of the fact that the world has faced fundamental transformations 
since the second global conflagration in all the domains of the human existence – 
political, economic, social, technological, etc. The same thing can also be said 
about war and the fight manner – though it has not disappeared, war has 
suffered dramatic transformations (Shultz and Dew, 2006, 1-17). If in the past 
the interstate symmetrical wars implying large-scale manoeuvres and 
conventional weaponry predominated, nowadays there can be seen a 
regionalization of conflicts, noting in particular the increase in the number of 
civil, ethnic and local conflicts, low-intensity conflicts implying guerrilla fights, 
attrition warfare and terrorist actions carried out by asymmetrical combatants. 
In conclusion, the two authors consider that war will not disappear but it will 
suffer a series of mutations adapting itself to a new context. Starting from this 
last finding related to the impact of context change on the form of manifestation 
of war as phenomenon, we shall try hereinafter to identify the main 
transformations suffered by the international post-Cold War environment that 
determined the increase of the conflict potential and favoured the 
transformation of war.  
The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar order 
had the impact of a major geopolitical seism. Numerous ethnic or national 
groups felt the opportunity of liberation and recognition and the elimination of 
the ‘cover,’ the withdrawal of the support, the absence of constrains and control 
from the part of the superpowers opened a veritable Pandora’s box. A series of 
regional or local conflicts, kept previously under control, burst violently, 
unleashing frustrations and complaints, following ideological and nationalist 
objectives. In another category were the states whose leaders had privatised the 
power transforming the institutions, the citizens and the resources of the 
country into personal goods and in relation to which the superpowers had 
shown either an artificial support or disinterest. With the change of power 
balance at the global level, the internal groups of rebels overtook power 
imposing the same type of inefficient and dangerous government, perpetuating 
the cycle of violence and greediness (Zartman 2007, 4).  
The new international context is marked by the rampant evolution of the 
globalisation phenomenon which supposes, inter alia, the elimination of all 
obstacles to the creation of a total freedom of economic forces, commerce 
without frontiers and the elimination of commercial barriers in order to open 
the territory towards the global movement of capital, goods and services. The 
rhythm of globalisation determines the reduction of the states’ sovereignty and 
the emergence of new international actors, powerful players within the system; 
it determines the permeability of the national frontiers, the loss of the legitimate 
monopoly on coercion held traditionally by state actors; it also supports the 
processes of linguistic and cultural homogenization invading all life sectors. This 
phenomenon does not have only supporters and winners, determining the 
increase in the number of threats and in the degree of insecurity, creating an 
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environment characterised by the lack of certainty in a predictable future, 
essentially, of mitigation or loss of a distinct identity. All these aspects shape 
numerous frustrations, creating tension and amplifying the tendencies of 
localisation and isolation in relation to the ‘Other,’ the stranger. In these 
conditions, many of those feeling threatened by the economic and cultural 
impact of globalisation fall into the trap of radicalism and religious extremism 
(Williamson 2009, 13-14), a major threat to international peace and a source of 
conflict in the new security environment. The fast-growing rhythm of the 
population in certain areas of the world, especially those affected by poverty, the 
rapid urbanization within these regions concomitantly with the lack of decent 
life conditions contribute to the accumulation of pressures and the exacerbation 
of instability. And when these tendencies are doubled by the scarce presence of 
water, food or energy resources, violent conflicts are inevitable.  
Another characteristic of the new international environment which 
contributes to the increase of the conflict potential refers to technological 
development, especially in the military domain. Although the increase of the 
global connectivity can bring numerous benefits for the states, individuals and 
for the international community in general, sometimes, it can generate a series of 
pervert effects, unwanted and extremely difficult to control – the export of terror 
and extremism, the increase of access to all forms of weapons of mass 
destruction, the use of internet in order to carry out cyber attacks, the 
manipulation of mass-media, etc.  
A reality of the post-modern world, with deep implications for the security 
environment, is related to the presence of weak, failed or rogue states within the 
international system. Extremely vulnerable, incapable of ensuring internal order, 
exporters of instability and violence (Buzan 2000, 106-109), these states become 
genuine sanctuaries for criminal groups and extremist organisations, offering 
both a suitable ground for training and organisation and a rich area for 
recruiting new adepts.  
In conclusion, we live now a ‘new normality.’ The international security is 
threatened by terrorist groups and organised crime, by weak and failed states 
incapable of ensuring the basic needs to their own citizens, by the absence or the 
scarceness of the vital resources. The concept of national sovereignty is the 
target of some unprecedented attacks, the entrance into a post-Westphalian era 
being brought into discussion; the technological evolution in the domain of 
communication, transport and global networks continues to render the frontiers 
more and more transparent; the economies – more interconnected and the 
access to information – possible in an unprecedented way. These effects of 
globalisation generate powerful pressures and contribute to the increase of the 
regional instability (Olson 2009, 3) and to the outbreak of some bloody conflicts. 
All these changes leave their mark on war producing significant shifts.  
 
Conflicts and Instability in Contemporary Security Environment 
377 
Distinct Visions on Post-Cold War Wars 
With the end of the Cold War, numerous academics and experts in the field have 
reflected on the shifts suffered by the international environment, in an attempt 
to catch the impact of the transformation of the international strategic 
environment on war and the fight manner. Thus, a comprehensive process of 
analysis and re-conceptualisation began, the major stake being the identification 
of the main features of future war. Such an approach may and must allow mainly 
state actors, exposed to new threats, to prepare for future fights against 
asymmetrical, inventive and flexible enemies. If military specialists agree on the 
reference points of the new security environment and on the threats which 
contribute to context transformation, the opinions diverge when trying to 
conceptualise the future post-Cold War wars. While some people consider that 
we are confronted with a ‘fourth generation war’ (4GW), others argue that the 
term ‘new wars’ is the most adequate to describe the new realities. Another 
trend is represented by the military strategists opting for the concept of ‘hybrid 
war’ in an attempt to explain the mutations suffered by this phenomenon in the 
new context. Irrespective of the concept preferred, all these authors have 
contributed to the understanding of the global context, emphasizing the 
characteristics of future wars. 
The Fourth Generation War 
In a study on the evolution of modern war, the theoreticians and military 
analysts have defined four development stages. The first generation of the 
modern war, following the Westphalian peace was dominated by mass wars, 
culminating in the French revolution wars and the Napoleonic wars at the 
beginning of the 19th century. The second generation was characterised by the 
increase of the firepower and the manoeuvre capacity culminating in the First 
World War. The development of the manoeuvre capacity and the revolution 
initiated by the German army through the blitzkrieg tactics during the second 
world conflagration represent the distinctive features of the third generation 
war. Beginning with the end of the 1970s, following the Soviet-Afghan and 
American-Vietnamese wars, the fourth generation of wars registered a 
significant evolution, highlighting the capacity of a non-conventional enemy of 
exploiting for his own benefit the transformations from the political, economic 
and social environment (Frunzeti 2006, 96-97).  
Even though the term is introduced in literature only in 1989 by William 
Lind (1989), this concept proves successful in the first years following the Cold 
War. The proponents of this concept argue that the development of the fourth 
generation war was favoured by the lost of the monopoly on violence by the 
nation-state, the appearance of non-state actors eager and able to challenge the 
legitimacy of the state, the evolution of globalisation and particularly of the 
advanced technology, the outbreak of cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts 
Olesea Țăranu 
378 
(Robb 2004). In the framework of these conflicts, the borders between war and 
politics or soldiers and civilians disappear (Hoffman 2007, 18). The targets are 
both soldiers and non-combatants, religious ideas, political power, economic 
activities, international agreements but also people’s minds. The fighters’ actions 
target not only the physical destruction but also the mental and moral impact on 
the opponents (Williamson 2009, 3). The theoreticians of the new concept 
consider that the strategies and tactics of this new type of war appeared as 
almost a necessity, being triggered by the major discrepancies between state and 
non-state actors, as far as resources are concerned. In a disadvantaged position, 
non-state actors need to adopt irregular and asymmetrical methods in their 
attempt to avoid the military force of the enemy and to hit his critical political, 
cultural, communication points in order to affect the morale of the population 
and to destroy the leaders’ will to continue the fight (Robb 2004). These 
asymmetrical fighters are willing to die for their beliefs, do not wear national 
uniforms, easily mingle among civilians being thus difficult to identify, are 
creative, always looking for innovative methods and tactics and do not take into 
account the international norms. Their attacks contribute to the creation of an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust of authorities’ capacity to ensure the 
protection of citizens, stress the divisions created within the civil society, affect 
the economic activity and destroy the internal cohesion of the society 
(Williamson 2009, 4). The fourth generation war is not a new form of war but 
rather a return to the war fought before the emergence of the nation-state. 
Neither tactics are new; they seem to be rather terrorist or guerrilla tactics but 
using modern technology (Williamson 2009, 7). In this case, the novelty is 
represented by the pattern of the combatants (states or non-state groups) and 
what motivates them to fight (Lind 2004, 7). 
New Wars 
The change of the international context with the end of the Cold War and the 
high number of bloody conflicts that burst on the African continent determined a 
series of authors to focus on the distinct realities within weak states, with a poor 
governance, considering that we are the witnesses of some significant shifts in 
the deployment manner of the war in these regions. One of the concepts that 
enjoyed success and visibility, especially among the academics, was that related 
to the ‘new wars.’ In order to understand the essence of this phenomenon, we 
will try to underline, briefly, the specificity of the ‘old wars.’ The origin of the old 
war must be found in the Western Europe of the 16th – 19th centuries, the 
evolution of this modern fight manner being closely linked to the development of 
the state as the main form of political organization within the international 
system. Building on the observation of the Prussian military strategist Carl von 
Clausewitz on the political character of war (and the famous theory of the 
‘remarkable trinity’) as well as on Max Weber’s conception on the essential 
characteristic of the state of representing the only form of organization holding 
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the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, both internally and externally, 
we are able to outline the essence of this phenomenon attesting the fact that the 
modern war was the result of a rational calculation and that it was fought by, 
through and in the interest of the states. Mary Kaldor considered that old wars 
were at their peak at the middle of the 20th century when the use of science and 
technology for killing, doubled by the extraordinary capacity of massive 
mobilisation of the states leaded to unimaginable destructions. From this point 
of view, the author considers the Cold War a method of maintaining the idea of 
old war alive (Kaldor 2010, 15). 
However, with the end of the Cold War and the fundamental change of the 
social relations that supported the old understanding of war, we witness today a 
dismissal of the Clausewitz/Weberian logic. The new, postmodern wars are 
based on three important assertions which seem to define them – the conflicts 
increasingly imply other actors than states, for other reasons than the traditional 
national interests, using tactics and instruments different from those associated 
with regular, professionalised armies (Butler 2009, 57). These are disorganised, 
even chaotic conflicts, powered by identity problems, fought by a wide range of 
combatants, supported by transnational networks illegally trafficking money, 
arms, people, by groups of organized crime, etc.  
The catalyst of these new wars is globalisation, with its simultaneously 
integrative and disintegrative tendencies, the clear-cut economic disparities, the 
negative perceptions that it creates and most of all with the two serious crises it 
generates – state crisis and identity crisis (Butler 2009, 58-59). Leaving the 
states in an incapacity of controlling their relations, domestically and externally, 
contributing to the lost of the monopoly on the use of organised violence, 
emphasising a series of transnational phenomena beyond the state control, the 
state faces some major challenges which question its survival, determining the 
entrance into a post-Westphalian era. As products of a complex 
interdependence, the new wars emphasise this existential state crisis, 
representing serious threats to the security of millions. Unfortunately, the state 
crisis is doubled in the current context by an identity crisis. While the old wars 
were fought in the name of the national interest, calling for either the national 
identity or certain ideological principles such as liberalism, socialism or fascism, 
in the case of the new wars we can observe major transformations. At a time 
when the globalisation phenomenon challenges in a fundamental manner the 
state eroding its power, the national cohesion and the individuals’ loyalty 
towards the state significantly diminish. In this case, it becomes obvious that 
citizens will look for what they have lost in other sources and the national 
identity associated to a declining state will be replaced by an ethnical, religious 
identity specific to a sub-group.  
Thus, the new wars represent the actions of some sub-state groups 
enjoying the support offered by different transnational networks, actions aiming 
at contesting, eroding and replacing the state authority. The actors involved have 
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an interest in obtaining power and in ensuring economic gains without taking 
into account the lack of legitimacy of their actions or the restrictions imposed on 
using brute force. Often, these types of wars suppose a high degree of violence 
and brutality, violence being both a means for the achievement of the final 
objective and the objective in itself. The new type of war elevates the 
demonization of the Other to the level of a deliberate strategy and massacres, 
genocide, criminal activities, systematic violation of human rights are some of its 
frequent manifestations (Butler 2009, 60). The technological development does 
not play an essential role in these conflicts. The combatants largely rely on light 
but extremely bloody rudimentary weapons; the privatisation of arms 
production as well as arms trafficking favoured by the dismantling of the Soviet 
Union represent specific opportunities of which these forces take full advantage. 
In the place of professionalised hierarchically-organised armies, new wars imply 
irregular forces, paramilitary groups, mercenaries, organised crime unions. 
Civilians are usually the target of these groups and the differences between 
combatants and non-combatants, between barbarity and civilised behaviour, on 
which the modern society is based, become irrelevant (Butler 2009, 60). Unlike 
old wars which ended with a victory or a defeat, the end of new wars is not 
expected equally rapidly: different combatant parties have an interest in 
continuing the violence, both from a politically and economically point of view. 
Moreover, they have the tendency to infiltrate among refugees, deployed persons 
and criminal networks and to propagate the ideologies they produce (Kaldor 
2010, 13). The supporters of the new wars concept also agree that these are not, 
actually, new. The novelty element is related to globalisation and this one, in 
turn, is linked to the changes occurred in the role of the state (Kaldor 2010, 23). 
The Hybrid War – a New Paradigm 
While, as we could notice, some authors consider that the post-Cold War wars 
represent the fourth generation wars or they share the belief that the term of 
new wars is more appropriate to describe the transformations occurred in the 
new international order, there is another category of authors that have reflected 
on the mutations suffered by the strategic environment and on their impact on 
the evolution of war. It should be noted that the latter group is formed by 
military strategists, former fighters or troop commanders (especially within 
Marine Corps), active participants in difficult missions of the US army that 
identified in the recent history a series of atypical missions which cannot be 
understood using the traditional language. The interventions in Mogadishu, 
Kosovo, Fallujah, Afghanistan, the war between Hezbollah and Israel from 2006 
present a series of characteristics hard to explain by the military handbooks. 
These authors try to outline the mutations suffered by the war in the post-Cold 
War era opting for the use of a concept that has started to enjoy success and that 
can be found in the discourses of the officials as well as in a series of official 
documents and military strategies (American, British, Australian). Recognising 
Conflicts and Instability in Contemporary Security Environment 
381 
the significant dissipation of the differences between inter-state and intra-state 
conflicts, between combatants and civilians, between peace and war, military 
experts such as Frank Hoffman or James Mattis partly retake certain ideas that 
define the concepts of ‘the fourth generation war’ and ‘new wars’ and develop, in 
return, the concept of ‘hybrid war’ in order to describe the post-Cold War 
evolution. Starting from the recognition of the complex character of threats to 
the international security, threats determined or favoured by globalisation, arms 
and technology proliferation, the violent transnational extremism but also the 
resurrection of the former rival powers, Hoffman uses the term ‘convergence’ in 
order to describe war transformation – the convergence of the physical and 
psychological, combatants and non-combatants, violence and nation-building, 
the kinetic and nonkenetic (Hoffman 2009, 34). In an attempt to identify the 
reference points of the new international context and its impact on the US army, 
the two experts consider that the net conventional superiority of the American 
army determines other state and non-state actors to move out of the traditional 
military logic and seek some niche capabilities or some unexpected combination 
of tactics and technologies to gain an advantage (Mattis and Hoffman 2005, 1). 
Although the conventional war has not dissapeared from the mix of instruments 
used by the international actors, Mattis, who leaded the American forces in 
Fallujah in 2004, declared: “I think the nation-state and conventional war is in a 
state of hibernation. I don’t think it’s gone away, but the most likely threats 
probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state” (Barnes 
and Spiegel 2008). This statement seems to be supported by recent evolutions 
registered by the institutes for conflict analysis. For example, according to the 
most recent HIIK study – Conflict Barometer 2014, during the last year there was 
no inter-state war (HIIK 2015, 16). And if the chances of engagement in a 
conventional symmetrical war are reduced, we must expect an increase of the 
visibility of irregular challenges – terrorism, insurgence, unrestricted warfare, 
guerrilla war or coercion by narco-criminals (Mattis and Hoffman 2005, 1). 
Future wars will not observe the clear-cut distinction between 
conventional/irregular, combatant/non-combatant. The future opponent will 
chose from the existent ‘menu,’ a mix of tactics and instruments that will allow 
him to avoid the direct confrontation in our terms, by our rules. As Hoffman 
argues, the future will be marked by hybrid wars in which states and non-state 
actors will use simultaneously more fight types – conventional, irregular, 
terrorist, disruptive and criminal aiming at destabilising the existent order. 
Evans, summarizing the new tendencies, argued that “symmetric and 
asymmetric wars merge and Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth 
technology is met by suicide bombers” (Evans 2003, 140). Used both by states 
and non-state actors, by separate units or even by the same fight body, hybrid 
wars suppose the simultaneous use of a combination of conventional 
capabilities, irregular tactics, terrorist attacks and elements of organised crime 
in order to obtain a synergetic effect (Hoffman 2007, 14). The term hybrid is 
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applicable both at the organisational level (where we can find simultaneously a 
hierarchical political structure and decentralised cells or networks of tactic 
units) as well as at the level of the means used. The hybrid opponents will exploit 
the access to modern and sophisticated military capabilities, combining the 
lethal character of the state conflict and the fanaticism of the irregular wars 
(Hoffman 2009, 38). Thus, the future does not necessarily imply the increase of 
the threats number but the convergence of the existent threats in a hybrid form 
of war. The most important mutation in the war character implies the dissipation 
of the borders delimitating the different fight methods and their simultaneous 
combination. 
Among the victims of the terrorist attacks from 2001 we can also find the 
feeling of invulnerability of the United States along with the West preference for 
conventional wars. That was a lesson for everyone – allies or enemies, state or 
non-state actors. The terrorists’ success represented a proof of the mutations 
occurred in the fight manner showing the necessity of adaptation to the new 
context – a conceptual, strategic, operational adaptation. The obstinacy of 
persisting within the same intellectual and institutional borders is nothing but a 
losing solution in relation to a potential enemy not suffering from our handicap – 
the intellectual rigidity. The term ‘hybrid war’ describes the increasing 
complexity of the future conflicts and the necessity of flexible military forces able 
to easily adapt. Nowadays combatants (especially states) wishing to gain hybrid 
wars must learn to strike a balance between the conventional capabilities 
specific to the Cold War and the fight style specific to small-scale irregular wars. 
Troops must be prepared to fight and, at the same time, to carry out missions of 
peacekeeping, reconstructions, stability, international aid, etc. When the enemy 
acts on a multidimensional level, the national armies of the states trying to 
maintain their position in the military hierarchy and to obtain the victory must 
do the same. The future wars will require flexible ‘multi-purpose’ units and an 
essential role will be played by the leaders of these units who will have to prove 
innovative thinking and an increased capacity of adaptation in a complex and 
changing environment. The future enemies will not adopt tactics specific to the 
weak and they will not retreat into the mountains. On the contrary, they will 
choose “tactics of the smart and agile, presenting greater reach and lethality. 
They may attempt to operate within heavily populated cities, and use the 
networks of an urban metropolis to maneuver within as well as to sustain 
themselves” (Hoffman 2007, 43). As demonstrated by the Hezbollah fighters in 
their fight against the much more powerful Israeli army in Lebanon, by a series 
of small-scale Jihadist organisations or, more recently by the pro-Russian troops 
in the east of Ukraine, some extremely disciplined well trained and spread out 
cells may contest and challenge the modern conventional forces by using an 
innovative and concurrent mix of guerrilla tactics and performing technologies 
within the densely populated urban centres. In a study on hybrid wars, colonel 
John McCuenn argued that for winning this new form of war, the West must 
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obtain simultaneous victories on three battle fields – on the conventional battle 
field, through the conventional operations conceived with the aim of achieving 
long-term objectives, on the field represented by the indigenous population from 
the conflict area through some strategies of the type ‘clear, control and counter-
organize’ and on the battlefield represented by the indigenous population and 
the international community through actions aiming at winning and maintaining 
war support and legitimacy (McCuenn 2008, 111). The conclusions of the 
military expert emphasize a distinctive feature of the new wars – fights are 
fought not only physically, on a traditional battlefield but also, and maybe in an 
equal measure, among the indigenous populations, home front, and international 
populations. Understanding this state of affairs means understanding both the 
threat and the solution. By ‘clearing, controlling and counter-organizing’ the 
population simultaneously with conventional operations, insurgencies and civil 
wars could be prevented. Essentially, these actions seek to ensure stability, 
promote local values, identify and train potential leaders, support the bottom-up 
development, protect the indigenous population and contribute to the reduction 
of the attractiveness of the insurgent organisations offering alternatives 
(McCuenn 2008, 111-112). 
Conclusions 
The wars of the future will be difficult to label as conventional or irregular. The 
transformations suffered by the international context and the war as a 
phenomenon will determine the blurring of the demarcation line between the 
two classic fight manners. It’s highly probable that the great majority of future 
conflicts will take the form of hybrid wars. The traditional form of conflict 
implying two national armies will be less predominant in comparison to the non-
traditional types. This is particularly the case of the United States of America. 
Very few armies may hope to obtain a victory against the American troops using 
only the traditional fight methods. It is inevitable that those state actors or even 
non-state entities willing to contest their supremacy to opt for hybrid forms of 
fight in order to achieve their own objectives. 
The hybrid war, without being an abnormality, will represent an essential 
characteristic of the future security environment. Though it does not exclude the 
outbreak of traditional, conventional, symmetric wars, the hybridisation 
tendency of the war will be a major challenge for the international actors of the 
21st century. Disregarding this mutation and focusing exclusively on the 
development of the conventional arsenal is nothing but a losing solution. No 
state army has recently succeeded in obtaining victory against a non-state 
enemy, in a non-conventional war. The evolution of war requires the increase of 
the flexibility and adaptability degree. Future enemies will not fight by our rules, 
the wars we choose. The first lesson of the military history – ‘the enemy gets a 
vote’ – continues to be currently relevant and the soldiers hoping to obtain 
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victory against an apparently weaker, but at the same time more flexible, 
innovative, sophisticated and determined enemy must be aware of this.  
If these mutations in war evolution are based on the universal crisis of 
state legitimacy we can conclude that all states are vulnerable to the new hybrid 
threats.  
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